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1. Introduction
One of the facts of warfare is that victory in battle weakens the opposition making further
victories easier. There are exceptions in conﬂicts over large geographical areas - for example the
French and German invasions of Russia failed despite initial successes due to the overstretch of
supply - but in regional conﬂicts over good terrain, absent outside intervention typically one side
eventually achieves enough success that it is ultimately able to win the war. Outright victory tends
to lead to peace, albeit the peace of the strong ruling the weak. Examples of this are the Union
victory in the U.S. Civil War, the defeat of Napoleon and the defeat of Germany and Japan in the
Second World War.
When there is outside intervention the weak may be propped up for a long period of time or
even indeﬁnitely leading to prolonged and often very bloody conﬂicts that may last decades or even
generations. This depends in part on the goals of the outside powers and their strength. In many
cases they support a balance of power, either for selﬁsh reasons, to assure weak opposition, as in
the case of Britain supporting a balance of power in continental Europe over many centuries, or
because diﬀerent outside powers take diﬀerent sides in a conﬂict. Two obvious examples of conﬂicts
prolonged over decades by outside intervention maintaining a balance of power are the Vietnam
War, and the conﬂict between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. By contrast conﬂicts
without outside intervention - such as World War II or the US Civil war - are typically short,
lasting on the order of ﬁve years before one side wins. We do not address the issue of the relative
desirability of short term peace versus long-term conﬂict, but instead try to develop a useful model
of the length and nature of conﬂict and how it depends upon outside intervention.
The model we develop is a stochastic model of regional conﬂicts. Under modest assumptions,
absent outside intervention one side will win - and relatively quickly - leading to a hegemony and a
long peace - that of the conqueror over the vanquished. By contrast, outside intervention typically
supports the weaker side and can lead to a balance of power rather than a hegemony. By doing so
it typically prolongs conﬂict. It does, however, protect the weak from the strong. Hence there is
a trade-oﬀ: peace being desirable on the one-hand and the protection of the weak being desirable
on the other. We ﬁnd that when the latter is a priority the level of intervention is a relevant
determinant of the nature and length of the conﬂict, with stronger intervention being generally
preferable towards the goal of minimizing casualties.
This research is in a rather diﬀerent direction than existing theoretical work on conﬂict. Here we
follow Levine and Modica (2013) in viewing conﬂict as an inevitable and mechanical consequence
of opposing powers being present without substantial geographical barriers: this is in contrast to
a substantial body of literature which asks whether conﬂict is rational - see, for example Fearon
(1995) or Hirshleifer, Boldrin and Levine (2009). It complements the substantial empirical work
on conﬂict - for example Fearon and Laitin (2003) showing how prolonged civil wars have led to a
larger number of existing conﬂicts over time.
We ﬁrst develop a stochastic model of regional conﬂict, then we discuss the implications in a
number of diﬀerent conﬂicts historical and contemporary.
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2. The Basic Model
We examine a conﬂict between two groups denoted by j = 1, 2 that we refer to as societies -
these might be nation-states, non-governmental organizations, or bands of rebels.3 These societies
compete in a particular region in which the absence of signiﬁcant geographical or other barriers do
not provide natural protection against enemies. For example, the model is not intended to apply
to a mountainous region such as the Balkans where successful invasion and conquest is diﬃcult.
They compete over a broad set of resources we call land, although it should be understood that
land includes the people, ﬁxed capital, natural resources, ﬁrms, the military and so forth which
exist on that land; this means we should think of units of land as measured by the resources they
contain not by square miles, so for example a city block might represent a unit of land equivalent
to a unit of land constituting many square miles of barren desert. Notice that we do not deal with
situations where one group does not hold land or resources, but rather engages in violent activity
such as terrorism then conceals itself within the broader society. At the moment we assume also
that there are no outside inﬂuences: we will generalize the model to allow for this subsequently.
The region comprises L ≥ 3 discrete units of land and the conﬂict takes place over time t =
1, 2, . . . We denote the land-holding of society j at time t by Ljt ≥ 0, so that L1t + L2t = L at all
t. The time unit is chosen so that at most one unit of land can change hands in one period. When
discussing society j we will typically refer to the opposing society by k.
Institutional Strength and Aggregate Power
The outcome of a conﬂict depends in part on the institutional strength of the societies. For
example, in 1846 over a period of a few weeks thirty three people seized control of the state
of California from Mexico. This was possible because Mexican institutions in California were
exceptionally weak. We represent the institutional strength of society j by a coeﬃcient γj > 0
we call unit power intended to capture the eﬃciency of a society in conﬂict. This includes the
stability of the government, the ability to collect taxes and conscript soldiers - and depends in turn
on the law-abidingness of citizens, the eﬃciency of the courts, and the overall economic strength
of the society. There are diﬀerent ways in which societies may generate unit power. For example,
during the cold war the United States had low taxes capturing a small fraction of the resulting high
GDP, while the Soviet Union had high taxes capturing a large fraction of the resulting low GDP:
in diﬀerent ways each generated substantial unit power.
The critical feature of the model - and reality - is that ability to prevail in conﬂict depends not
only on unit power but also on total available resources that in our simple model are represented by
land - meaning a larger population and typically a more powerful military. So holding more land
makes it easier to prevail in conﬂict. Indeed, if China were to go to war with Hong Kong, despite
the much higher per capita GDP in Hong Kong there is little doubt about the outcome of such a
war - the vastly greater resources of China would bring the war to a conclusion in a matter of days
3A related model with more societies can be found in Levine and Modica (2017).
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if not hours. By contrast a well organized military supported by strong civil institutions such as
Israel may have an advantage in the form of a high value of γj over a larger less well organized
opponent such as Egypt. To capture this size component we introduce the notion of aggregate
power: the aggregate power of a society j is given by ϕjt = ϕ(γj , Ljt) where ϕ(γj , 0) = 0 and
the function ϕ(γj , Ljt) is increasing in both γj and Ljt: greater unit power and greater resources
both increase aggregate power. To visualize one may think of the simple multiplicative linear form
ϕ(γj , Ljt) = γjLjt. As a society gains land it gains strength because it commands greater resources,
and as it loses land it loses strength because it commands fewer resources.
Conﬂict Resolution and the Markov Process
Conﬂict is a risky business: weather, luck in warfare, heroism, being in the right place at the
right time - all these things matter in determining the result of a conﬂict. To account for this we
introduce a stochastic model: we denote by 1 ≥ p(ϕjt, ϕkt) ≥ 0 the conﬂict resolution function - the
probability that society j gains a unit of land from society k. Naturally p(ϕ1t, ϕ2t)+p(ϕ2t, ϕ1t) ≤ 1
since only one society can gain a unit of land. In fact, we assume that the inequality is strict: there
is a chance that nothing happens and that neither society gains a unit of land from the other.
The critical - and obvious - assumption is that p(ϕjt, ϕkt) is increasing in ϕjt and decreasing
in ϕkt. The stronger is a society and the weaker its opponent the more likely it is to prevail and
gain land. This is by no means a new idea: in military theory it is known as Lanchester's Law
- although that refers to a deterministic diﬀerential equation rather than a stochastic process in
which luck plays a role.
The conﬂict resolution function deﬁnes a Markov chain. Taking as the state variable the land
holding Ljt of society j and letting Lkt = L− Ljt be the land holding of the opponent we see that
with probability p(ϕ(γj , Ljt), ϕ(γk, Lkt)) society j gains a unit of land to Lj,t+1 = Ljt + 1 and with
probability p(ϕ(γk, Lkt), ϕ(γj , Ljt)) it loses a unit of land to Lj,t+1 = Ljt−1 and with the remaining
probability keeps the original amount of land Lj,t+1 = Ljt. Indeed, this is a special type of Markov
chain called a birth-death process.
The crucial feature of the model is that as Ljt grows the probability that it continues to grow
goes up. That is, as society j gains land its aggregate strength increases, the aggregate strength of
its opponent decreases and so the probability with which it wins land goes up. This says - in eﬀect
- that a balance of power between two societies is unlikely. Through random luck one society or
the other will gain the upper hand, and when it does so it will not need so much luck to prevail
over the other society resulting in a situation we refer to as hegemony - one of the two societies
controls all the land. In a hegemony of j we have Ljt = L. We now introduce some formal tools
for analyzing Markov processes which make this point more precisely.
Resistance
As one society becomes predominant - controls most of the land - the chances that the weaker
society is able to wrest a unit of land in the face of overwhelming opposition becomes very small.
For example, on December 2, 1913 in Alsace-Lorraine a shoemaker Karl Blank laughed at German
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soldiers, and was beaten and paralyzed. Subsequently there were protests of up to 3,000 people:
needless to say the probability that this rebellion would succeed in wresting control of the Alsace-
Lorraine region from the German Empire was very small and indeed it did not succeed. By contrast
on October 8, 1911 in Wuhan China a rebel SunWu was seriously injured by a bomb he was building,
resulting in his capture and imminent execution. To avert this, soldiers of the New Army in the
local barracks mutinied. The probability that this rebellion would succeed in wresting control of
China away from the Emperor was also very small - and indeed numerous similar revolts over the
past decade had collapsed resulting in the execution or exile of their leaders. This one, however,
succeeded and less than a year later the Empire had fallen.
The idea that prevailing over overwhelming opposition is very unlikely but never-the-less can
happen is captured by a parameter  > 0 which is a small number: we require that the probability
of such events is positive but it goes to zero with . A simple way to formalize this is to assume
that the probability of j losing land to k is given by p(ϕkt, ϕjt) = p0(ϕkt, ϕjt)
r(ϕjt,ϕkt) where
r(ϕjt, ϕkt) ≥ 0 is called the resistance of society j to losing land to k and 0 < p0(ϕkt, ϕjt) < 1.
Thus for  > 0 indeed every transition has positive probability; but if the resistance r(ϕjt, ϕkt) > 0
then p(ϕkt, ϕjt) goes to zero with  - and the faster the higher r is. These events are interpreted
as very unlikely since the idea is that we observe the process for small . On the other hand for
transitions with zero resistance p(ϕkt, ϕjt) = p0(ϕkt, ϕjt) so their probability remains positive in
the limit - these are the not so unlikely events. So: if r(ϕjt, ϕkt) > 0 it is very unlikely that j
loses land to k, while if r(ϕjt, ϕkt) = 0 that occurrence is in comparison not so unlikely - always
for small .
With the notion of resistance we can apply powerful tools from the theory of Markov chains to
analyze the conﬂict model when  is small.
Hegemonic Resistance and Weak Geographic Barriers
Since the probability of winning land p(ϕjt, ϕkt) increases in own aggregate power and decreases
in the opponent's aggregate power, we make the same assumption concerning the resistance to losing
land: if resistance of j to losing land r(ϕjt, ϕkt) is positive it increases in own aggregate power and
decreases in opponent aggregate power.
A hegemony once obtained will not persist forever. There can be internal dissension resulting
in rebels seizing a unit of land. Since ϕ(γk, 0) = 0, if j has a hegemony the resistance to this
is rhj = r(ϕ(γj , L), 0), which we call the hegemonic resistance. We assume that the institutional
strength of the two societies is great enough that they have positive resistance to losing land when
they hold a hegemony: that is, we assume that rhj > 0 for j = 1, 2. Observe that this implies that
in the limit as → 0 a hegemony, once entered, persists forever (it is absorbing); for small  it will
last for a long time, and we will investigate how long this will be.
We also want to capture the idea that we are modeling a region within which geographical and
other barriers are weak. We do so by assuming that the weaker society - unprotected by barriers as
it is - has no resistance to losing land. When geographical barriers are strong it may be that neither
of two nearly equal powers has a realistic chance of taking land from the other. It is no mystery
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why Switzerland is Switzerland or the Balkans are Balkanized - this is a matter of mountains and
rugged terrain ill-suited for invasion. But our goal here is to study conﬂict that takes place in a
region within which there are not important geographical barriers.4 To capture this notice that
monotonicity implies that if ϕjt ≤ ϕkt then r(ϕjt, ϕkt) ≤ r(ϕkt, ϕjt), that is the weaker has lower
resistance. We assume it has zero resistance:
Assumption 1. If 0 < ϕjt ≤ ϕkt then r(ϕjt, ϕkt) = 0.
This implies that if the opposing society is at least as strong then the probability of losing land
is positive as  → 0. Notice that this also crucially implies that at any given conﬁguration if j's
resistance is strictly positive then k's resistance has to be zero. The typical resistance conﬁguration
is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Land holdings and resistance of j and k




Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving
left is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose
land and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated by
the arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process.
3. Stochastic Stability and Hegemony
We are now in a position to give a theoretical analysis of the Markov process. First, our
assumptions guarantee that the Markov process is aperiodic and ergodic for  > 0, which in turn
implies that there is a unique ergodic probability distribution µ over the state space describing
how frequently the diﬀerent states are visited. From Young (1993) and the regularity conditions on
resistances, we also know that as → 0 the ergodic distributions µ have a unique limit µ0 and that
4It is also the case that particular military technology may favor the defense so that even in the absence of
geographical barriers invasion is impractical. However historical examples of this type are diﬃcult to ﬁnd. One
example may be the stand-oﬀ between the Roman Empire and Persia: the two powers used incompatible military
technologies, neither able to defeat the other.
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this limit places weight only on absorbing states for the process with  = 0. For simplicity we will
refer to these states simply as absorbing with the understanding this is true only when  = 0. The
absorbing states that have positive probability in the limit distribution µ0 are called stochastically
stable: they represent the state or states which are observed most of the time when  is small.
It should be apparent that when  = 0 the hegemonies of j = 1, 2 are absorbing: since the
hegemonic resistance is by assumption positive when  = 0 the probability of leaving hegemony is
also zero. By contrast, Assumption 1 implies that all the other states are transient when  = 0. The
key idea is that the society that is weaker in aggregate power always has a positive probability of
losing land to the strong: this further weakens them and strengthens the opposition - so that there
is a positive probability from any state Lj of reaching a hegemony of the society which begins with
greater aggregate power.5 Hence our ﬁrst result, which follow from Corollary 5 Levine and Modica
(2016) section 6.3, formally captures the instability of a balance of power between two societies:
Theorem 1. The stochastically stable state of the system is a hegemony of the society with the
highest unit power γj; if the two are equal both hegemonies j = 1, 2 are stochastically stable.
We can say a bit more than that: we can say relatively how likely the two hegemonies are. Let
zj denote the state in which j has a hegemony, that is Lj = L. If we compute the relative ergodic
resistance




then the order of magnitude of µ(zj)/µ(zk) is 
ρ(zj ,zk). To compute ρ(zj , zk) what is needed
is the concept of radius which in the current context is the total resistance of the path from
one hegemony to another. Starting at the hegemony of j the resistance to losing one unit of
land is rhj . Once the ﬁrst unit of land is lost, the resistance to losing the second unit of land is
r(ϕ(γj , L− 1), ϕ(γk, 1)). We can continue, computing the resistance to losing each additional unit
of land until we reach a hegemony of k. If we add together these number we can deﬁne the radius
Rj = r
h
j +r(ϕ(γj , L−1), ϕ(γk, 1))+ . . . from a hegemony of j to a hegemony of k. From Levine and
Modica (2016) we ﬁnd that ρ(zj , zk) = Rk−Rj . That is, the relative frequency with which we see zj
to that with which we see zk is to an order of magnitude  raised to a power equal to the diﬀerence
between the least resistance of going from zk to zj and that of going the opposite direction. The
harder it is to go from one hegemony to the other, the more frequently we see that hegemony. In
particular, the stable hegemony is the one with higher radius. 6 Moreover, the expected length of
time before leaving the hegemony zj for the other zk is of order 
−Rj .
5It may be that the last ditch resistance in the ﬁnal stronghold is ﬁerce - but this does not change the fact that
loss is overwhelmingly likely: neither the famous last stand at Masada or the Alamo succeeded. By contrast the
battle of Marathon was far from a last stand: the Greeks ﬁghting away from their cities on favorable terrain were
only outnumbered by on the order of 3-1, not what we would consider overwhelming.
6Except as otherwise noted the proofs of the theorems in this paper are applications of results in Levine and
Modica (2016). A set of results for a related version of this model that allows for multiple societies can be found in
Levine and Modica (2017).
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Hegemonies are Common
Our theory says we should generally see hegemony. The idea of history being dominated by
hegemonic states may seem a strange one, but with some important exceptions it is borne out by
historical facts.7 Take, for example, the largely geographically isolated region of China: bounded
by jungles in the South, deserts on the West, cold arid wasteland in the North and the Paciﬁc Ocean
in the East. We ﬁnd that during the 2,234 years beginning from when we have decent historical
records in 221 BCE the area was ruled by a hegemonic state roughly 72% of the time, with ﬁve
interregna. Less reliable records exist for the area of Egypt, but in the 1,617 years from 2686 BCE
to the end of the new Kingdom in 1069 BCE we see hegemonic rule 87% of the time with two
interregna. In Persia during the 1,201 years from 550 BCE to 651 CE we see hegemony 84% of the
time with two interregna. England has been largely hegemonic within the geographically conﬁned
area of the island of Britain for 947 years from 1066 CE to the present. The Roman Empire ruled
the Mediterranean area as a hegemony for 422 years from the advent of Augustus in 27 BCE to the
permanent division into Eastern and Western Empires in 395 CE and the Eastern Roman Empire
lasted an additional 429 years until the advent of the Caliphate in 814 CE. The Caliphate itself
lasted 444 years until the Mongol invasion in 1258. After a 259 year gap, the Ottoman Empire
established a hegemony over the same general area for 304 years from the conquest of Egypt in
1517 CE to the Greek revolution in 1821 CE.
Hegemonies are not Ubiquitous
While hegemonies are common in history, there are two glaring exceptions: except for brief
periods neither the subcontinent of India nor, following the fall of the Western Roman Empire,
the area of continental Europe were subject to a hegemonic state: indeed the situation, especially
in Europe, can better be described as a balance of power between competing societies. Clearly
the theory is deﬁcient: it says that as one side gains an advantage it becomes more likely to gain
additional advantage. Evidentially this was not true in Europe and India. To see why this might
be the case the example of the Korean war is useful. In September 1950 North Korea was on the
verge of dominating the South. On the 15th of September the United Nations led by the United
States launched an amphibious invasion reversing the situation. But rather than gaining resources
and weakening the North Koreans the result of this success was the entry of China into the war on
the side of North Korea - resulting in the United Nations forces being pushed back and ultimately
a stalemate. The key point is: gaining land leads to greater weakness of the opponent only if it
does not draw outside intervention.
The intervention of outsiders - protected typically by their own strong geographic barriers so
not at risk in the conﬂict - is common in history. In Europe following the fall of Rome and up to
around 1066 we have the continued interference of northerners - the Vikings and later Swedes were
especially well protected by their own geography. Following 1066 we have the constant interference
7See Levine and Modica (2012) for data and sources.
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of England - also safe behind a water barrier: during this period we observe that England constantly
intervened in continental conﬂicts but always to support the weaker side, and eventually this policy
of balance of power became explicit.8 India also was subject to repeated invasion from central Asia
- protected not by water but by diﬃcult desert and mountain terrain.9 Of course China too was
subject to outside inﬂuence - particularly that of the Mongols. However, the relative size of the
Mongolia is quite small relative to China - less than half a percent of the population - while the
population of Scandinavia was about 5% that of continental Europe, that in central Asia about 5%
that of India, while England was about 8% of continental Europe.10
The role of England in maintaining a balance of power on the continent is well documented and
notorious for its complete cynicism. From the rise of Spain following the discovery of America in
1492 through Brexit in 2016 British foreign policy has largely been aimed at preventing a hegemony
over continental Europe. Many books (see for example Sheehan (1996)) have been written on the
topic and few discussions of European history fail to remark upon the striking fact that Britain
consistently changed sides in conﬂicts to support the losing side. Most dramatic perhaps is the shift
to an alliance with France in 1904 in the face of the German threat. Note that until the advent of
the European Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain this policy was quite successful. The latest
eﬀort to break up the continental hegemony of the EU - Brexit - may be less successful: contrary
to the predictions of its advocates it seems to have strengthened pro-European sentiment on the
continent.
To further advance the theory and understand the role of outside intervention in the balance of
power we now extend the model to incorporate outside intervention
4. Outside Intervention and the Balance of Power
We introduce outside forces with intervention power ϕ0. Outsiders are assumed to be protected
by geography, climate or sheer strength from action by the region in question. One example is the
aforementioned case of Great Britain with respect to continental Europe. Currently the U.S. and
8It is not completely correct to view England and Scandinavia as outsiders as at various time they had continental
interests and conversely, but the key point is that they had a core area relatively safe from invasion. In a diﬀerent
direction Hoﬀman (2013) argues a role also for the Western Catholic church which in Europe acted as a balancing
force much akin to to the outsiders of our model.
9The exact nature of the asymmetry in the physical geographical barrier is uncertain, but it is a fact that India has
been invaded numerous times successfully from Central Asia, but there have been no successful conquests of Central
Asia from India. Phil Hoﬀman in a private communication suggests that part of the answer may lie in the fact that
the area of Central Asia is well suited for raising horses and India is not, and that horses play a central military role
in conﬂict between Central Asia and India.
10Note that geographical factors matter in our argument only in so far as they give rise to outsiders who inﬂuence
the evolution of the relationships between the other groups. An existing literature, including Diamond (1998), gives
physical geography a direct role, arguing for example that the terrain of Western Europe is more defensible than
that of China, hence less susceptible to hegemony. Besides this particular claim being challenged on physical grounds
(Hoﬀman (2013)), such considerations have no bite in the Chinese case. Incidentally: while this discussion includes
only the area of Europe, Asia and North Africa, it should be borne in mind that until modern times 90% of the world
population lived in this area..
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Russia are outside forces with respect to the Middle East, being protected by distance, the ocean
(in the case of the U.S.) and by military strength from Middle Eastern societies.
These outside forces can reinforce society j and we focus on the case in which only one party to
the conﬂict is the beneﬁciary of outside intervention at any moment of time. We assume that these
outside forces have a ﬁxed power ϕ0. If society j is reinforced its combined power is φj = ϕj + ϕ0,
otherwise it is φj = ϕj . Hence the conﬂict resolution is now given by p(φjt, φkt) rather than
p(ϕjt, ϕkt), and the resistance function is also changed accordingly.
The behavior of outside forces is determined by an intervention policy which we initially take
to be exogenous. We study a simple but important intervention: intervention on behalf of the
weak.11 Speciﬁcally we assume the there exist thresholds Lj , Lk with Lj + Lk < L and such that
if Ljt ≤ Lj then outsiders reinforce society j. The inequality Lj + Lk < L means that Lj appears
on the left of Lk in the land line. Notice that we are agnostic about whether it is diﬀerent or the
same outsiders who reinforce j as who reinforce k; we discuss this further below when consider why
outsiders might intervene. The assumption that the size of intervention ϕ0 is the same on both
sides is a simpliﬁcation enabling us to focus on Lj as a measure of the strength of intervention.
It is useful at this point to denote combined power of j as φj(Ljt) since unit power γj is
determined by j while intervention is determined by Ljt (because Lkt = L− Ljt).
Stochastic Stability and the Balance of Power
In Appendix 1 we show that with outside intervention in addition to hegemonic states that
are stochastically stable there may also be balance of power segments consisting of a contiguous
collection of states. To analyze segments we extend the idea of an absorbing state to that of an
absorbing set - meaning that as → 0 the probability of escaping from the set goes to zero, but the
probability of moving about within the set remains positive. Hence segments are absorbing if at
the left end society j has positive resistance; at the right end society k has positive resistance; and
in the interior, if nonempty, both have zero resistance to losing land.12 From the general results of
Young (1993) discussed above only absorbing segments can be stochastically stable.
There may be no absorbing states at all, a situation we refer to as hegemony. In addition two
(and only two) types of absorbing segments are possible that we refer to as hot peace and prolonged
war. In both cases either the left endpoint of the segment is the intervention threshold for j or the
right endpoint of the segment is the intervention threshold for k.
First, let us explain why one of the endpoints must be an intervention threshold. Suppose the
left endpoint is not an intervention threshold. One of the two societies must be weak and have
zero resistance. If society j has zero resistance and there is no intervention threshold we move left
without resistance: society j loses land so we are not really at the left endpoint of an absorbing
segment. If, on the other hand, society k has zero resistance then as it loses land it continues
to have zero resistance at least until the intervention threshold is reached. If at the intervention
11Intervention on behalf of the strong may hasten hegemony but will not lead to a balance of power.
12We always measure the land of j from the left and the land of k from the right as in Figure 2.1.
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threshold the outsiders are strong enough to protect society k then this terminates the absorbing
segment - we cannot escape to the right. If the outsiders are not strong enough then resistance is
zero until hegemony is reached so there is no balance of power segment at all.
Second, the segment must either run the entire length between the intervention thresholds or
it must have length one. To see this, suppose that the segment starts at the left intervention
threshold. If moving a second step to the right has resistance then the segment has length one. If
it does not have resistance then moving further to the right continues to have no resistance at least
until we encounter the right intervention threshold and the outsiders come in to prop up society k.
Put diﬀerently: either k is strong enough to defend itself at the left intervention threshold so the
threshold is segment is short, or it is not, in which case the segment runs all the way until outside
intervention occurs.
This gives rise then to a classiﬁcation of absorbing segments:
Hot peace is a segment of length one at one of the intervention thresholds - that is either
Lj = Lj , Lj + 1 or Lk = Lk, Lk + 1 (inclusive). Here a single unit of land changes hands back and
forth. As well as a single hot peace segment there can be a pair of hot peace segments, one at each
intervention threshold.
Prolonged war is a segment running from one intervention threshold to the other, that is from
Lj = Lj to Lj = L−Lk inclusive. We also require that the intervention thresholds not be adjacent,
Lj + Lk < L− 1, so that the segment is longer than one and is not a hot peace.
Hot peace is modeled as a unit of land which changes hands back and forth to be clearly
contrasted with the prolonged war case. From a formal point of view if we were to subdivide the
units of land the length of hot peace segments would shrink while the length of prolonged war
segments would not. Hot peace can be thought of concretely as a relatively low key and peaceful
conﬂict, with border skirmishes going on without land actually being gained or lost - for example,
the recent conﬂict between Israel and Lebanon which occasionally ﬂares into the ﬁring of rockets
over the border or a small border incursion. The case also covers situations with a demilitarized or
neutral zone separating two opposing forces facing oﬀ against one another where again land does
not actually change hands - as in the Cold War. As this paper is not about the tactics of military
combat it is convenient to represent this as a single unit of land that changes hands back and forth
although as a practical matter this may not be true. The point is that while a hot peace is not
peace the level of conﬂict and casualties are low as the ﬁghting is extremely limited.
The case of prolonged war is on the contrary a real, bloody war where the two sides ﬁght back
and forth losing and gaining substantial amounts of land and not merely skirmishing at the border.
The civil war in Syria in the last years is a case in point.
Whether we see hot peace, prolonged war or hegemony depends on the strength of intervention.
We distinguish four levels of intervention on behalf of j:
Deﬁnition 1 (Intervention strength). 1. Strong. Intervention takes place when resistance is
positive in the absence of intervention: r(ϕj(Lj), ϕk(L− Lj)) > 0
2. Ineﬀective. Intervention is insuﬃcient to give positive resistance: r(ϕj(Lj)+ϕ0, ϕk(L−Lj)) =
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0; this includes the case where there is no intervention.
For the remaining cases we assume that #1and #2 do not hold, that is r(ϕj(Lj), ϕk(L−Lk)) = 0
and r(φj(Lj), φk(L− Lj)) > 0:
3. Medium. When j gains a unit of land above the threshold (thus losing support) the opponent
has zero resistance to losing land: r(φk(L− Lj − 1), φj(Lj + 1)) = 0 and Lj + Lk < L− 1.
4. Weak. When j gains a unit of land above the threshold the opponent has positive resistance
to losing land: r(φk(L− Lj − 1), ϕj(Lj + 1)) > 0
Depending on the level of intervention some segments are absorbing and others are not. In
Appendix 1 we characterize the relationship between intervention and the existence of absorbing
segments of diﬀerent types. The results are reported in the following
Theorem 2. Existence, if any, of absorbing segments depending on the type of intervention on
behalf of societies j and k can be summarized in the following table (where land is expressed in
units of Lj):
Table 1: Intervention and Peace
strong k medium k weak k ineﬀective k
strong j impossible impossible hot peace at L− Lk hegemony of j
medium j hegemony prolonged war or hot peace at Lj = L− Lk − 1 hot peace at L− Lk hegemony of j
weak j hot peace at Lj hot peace at Lj hot peace at both Lj and L− Lk hot peace at Lj
ineﬀective j hegemony of k hegemony of k hot peace at L− Lk hegemony
We are also interested in whether these absorbing segments are stochastically stable. As might
be expected this depends on the strength of the outside forces. In Appendix 2 we prove the
following:
Theorem 3. There exist ∞ ≥ ϕ0 ≥ ϕ0 > 0 such that if ϕ0 > ϕ0 and if intervention thresholds are
positive on both sides there are stochastically stable balance of power segments but not stochastically
stable hegemonies, while if ϕ0 < ϕ0 there are stochastically stable hegemonies but not stochastically
stable - or even absorbing - balance of power segments.
Analysis of the relative persistence of the absorbing sets in the presence of balance of power
segments is given in Appendix 3.
5. War and Peace
Theorem 2 shows that there is a non-monotonicity in the consequences of intervention. Inef-
fective intervention, not surprisingly, leads to peace in the form of hegemony. Weak intervention
leads to hot peace in which a weak opponent is propped up but can make no headway against
a strong opponent. An example of this is the intervention of the United States on behalf of the
Northern League in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. As the strength of intervention increases we have
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the possibility of more serious conﬂict - prolonged war - but eventually this goes away and conﬂict
subsides.
To understand this non-monotonicity it is useful to consider a simple case. Suppose that j and
k are equally strong so that γj = γk = γ, and that the intervention policy is symmetric so that
Lj = Lk. Hence intervention policy is indexed by a single scalar, the land threshold for intervention
on behalf of both contenders. We assume for the present discussion that the number of units of
land L is odd.13 Finally we assume that the strength of the intervenor(s) ϕ0 is high enough that
strong intervention is possible, but that it is ineﬀective for Lj suﬃciently small.
Here we increase the intervention threshold for both sides at the same time. Start with Lj
small. In this case as we have noted intervention is ineﬀective - there is no point in intervening
when j has become so weak that they have lost even with outside help. In this case there is no
balance of power segment, but rather a hegemony of one society: we refer to this as the peace of the
strong over the weak. As Lj increases, eventually the point is reached where intervention is weak.
As we indicated we now have a hot peace in which the weaker side survives by virtue of outside
support and the stronger side by virtue of their strength.
The key transition to understand is that from weak to medium intervention - because it is
medium intervention that leads to a prolonged war. Why is this? As the intervention threshold
increases the side receiving support is propped up when it is relatively strong: eventually strong
enough that the opposition no longer has resistance to losing land. At this point intervention
becomes medium and when launched from behind the shield of foreign protection success is now
possible and may sometimes range until intervention occurs on the side of the opponent. As an
example of this we might consider the second Vietnam war until the withdrawal of the United
States in 1973: here we have the United States intervening to prevent the fall of South Vietnam
and the Soviet Union intervening to prevent the fall of North Vietnam. The war ranged for nearly
twenty years with substantial battle deaths and loss and gain of territory on both sides and no
doubt would have gone longer had the United States not withdrawn its intervention.
As the strength of intervention Lj increases further the length of the prolonged war segment
shrinks reducing the scale of the conﬂict until eventually Lj reaches the center and we are again
at a hot peace. As an example of this we might consider the intervention of the United States on
both sides of the Israel/Egypt conﬂict at the Camp David accords in 1978: in eﬀect the United
States provides arms and support to both armies to stare at each other across a border that will
bring quick intervention in response to a violation.
We want to emphasize the non-monotonicity of the consequences of intervention in its strength:
a weak or strong intervention leads to hot peace, but a medium intervention leads to prolonged war
and it is the costliest in terms of lives and distress to the peoples and economies involved.
We may ask: why do we see prolonged war at all? Should not the participants knowing that
ﬁghting will simply rage back and forth between the intervention thresholds just skip the conﬂict?
13So it is feasible for the two thresholds Lj , Lk to be adjacent; this would be ruled out by symmetry if L is even.
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In an evolutionary model such as this there is in fact a prisoner's dilemma involved. If one side
decides not to ﬁght then it has no resistance to losing land but can never win it back, so it quickly
winds up permanently at the intervention threshold. A society that will not ﬁght will be whittled
away by a society that will ﬁght by losing land, but never gaining it. In fact we do not see societies
like this - probably because without intervention they will cease to exist. We note that even very
liberal modern democracies are quite aggressive in this respect: witness that Spain to this day lays
claim to Gibraltar - a bit of land that has been British for over three centuries.
In addition to conﬂicts corresponding to absorbing states when  = 0 we can have transitional
wars corresponding to movement between diﬀerent absorbing states - that is, from hegemony to
balance of power and back, or between diﬀerent balance of power segments. From Levine and
Modica (2016) we know that these conﬂicts must be relatively short in the sense that the expected
length of time before an absorbing conﬁguration is reached is bounded independently of  while the
length of time spent in an absorbing conﬁguration grows without bound as → 0.
6. Balance of Power and Modern Conﬂict
We shortly turn to details of diﬀerent conﬁgurations and illustrate them with examples. In
addition to discussing speciﬁc cases, we gather the substantial post World War II conﬂicts in the
form of tables. Cases where one combatant did not occupy any land are excluded as the theory does
not apply. For the rest we examined each postwar conﬂict in the Uppsala database. We excluded
those marked as insigniﬁcant, those involving military coups, those involving invasions of minor
powers by major powers (for example: 1956 invasion of Hungary) and guerrilla conﬂicts where the
guerrillas did not control land and resources (for example: the Basque region). We examined each
remaining conﬂict and believe that we have included the most signiﬁcant. In some cases there
were several intervention regimes: we discuss those separately. The data about individual conﬂicts
is taken from Wikipedia. The tables show the region, the year in which the conﬂict began, and
the number of years it lasted. Casualties (including civilian casualties) are reported in deaths per
100,000 per year which is the standard unit for reporting, for example, murder rates.14 To put
these numbers in context, note that the overall murder rate for Europe and Asia is about 3, for
the entire world about 6, and for Africa about 12 and for the Americas about 16. So, for example,
the death rate of 20 in the Sri Lankan civil war (a hot peace) is comparable to the murder rate in
the Americas, while the death rate of 380 in the Syrian civil war (a prolonged war) is an order of
magnitude higher. Following the casualty rates we list the parties and outside intervenors. In cases
when war ended due to the withdrawal of intervention we report the collapse as the number of
subsequent years until one side achieved victory. Entries in the table are arranged in chronological
order.
14Civilian casualties are the bulk of casualties and there are a wide range of estimates. We used the middle of the
range of estimates.
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Before examining the details, it is worth taking a broad overview of our ﬁndings. Intervention
that either is designed to preserve the balance of power or which does so because of conﬂicting
interests of the intervenors can lead either to a hot peace or a prolonged war. There is a large
discontinuity in the amount of harm done in a hot peace and a prolonged war: in a hot peace death
rates are on the order of relatively high murder rates, or in some cases lower, while in a transitional
or prolonged war they are an order of magnitude larger than very high murder rates. Taking the
Sri Lankan civil war as an example of hot peace we see that for 26 years the death rate was about
20, comparable to the highest murder rates in the world. Taking the breakup of India and Pakistan
after the British withdrawal as an example of a transitional war it was vastly bloodier - the death
rate was about 250. However, the Sri Lankan civil war lasted 26 years so the total is about 520, more
than double that in India and Pakistan where the transitional war lasted only a year. Overall a hot
peace does not seem to represent much of a savings in terms of casualties over non-intervention and
a transitional war - but it does protect the weak. From a policy point if we were to take the point
of view that, say, Lebanon posed a threat, then keeping it a bloody mess for three decades would
surely neutralize that threat - but from a humanitarian point of view it represents a catastrophe.
If we are to take a very cynical view of the conﬂict between Shia and Sunni, especially the current
war in Syria, as a Western eﬀort to preserve a balance of power that neutralizes the Arab world
as a threat - the wave of refugees descending on Europe with the consequent social and political
problems shows that such an eﬀort can have pretty heavy unintended consequences.
6.1. Weak Intervention and Hot Peace
Theory. Weak intervention leads to hot peace: a single unit of land that changes hands back
and forth always at the threshold for intervention. The intervenor prevents their side from losing,
but is unwilling to help them win. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.1. These hot peace segments can
also occur in pairs as illustrated in ﬁgure 6.2. In the discussion that follows we conﬁne attention
to the case of a single segment as it is the relevant one in practice.
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Figure 6.1: Single Hot Peace from Lj
Lj → ← Lk
rk(φ) rj(φ)
0 LLj Lj + 1
Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving
left is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose
land and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated by
the arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process. The arrows
indicate that from Lj to Lj + 1 and back there is zero resistance.
Figure 6.2: Hot Peace Pair
Lj → ← Lk
rk(φ) rj(φ)
Lk0 LLj
Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving
left is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose
land and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated by
the arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process. The back
and forth arrows indicate the location of the balance of power segments where the system
moves with no resistance. Discontinuities in resistances again appear at the intervention
thresholds.
Discussion. Hot peace with weak intervention is matched against the strength of the opponent:
one example is in Afghanistan, which has had varied intervention policies over the years since civil
war begin in 1978. Initially the Soviet Union intervened and a prolonged war resulted until the
Soviet withdrawal in 1988. What followed seems to have been a hot peace where intervention was
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matched against the strength of the opponent: the Taliban overran most of the country, but a small
enclave remained under the control of the Northern League propped up by foreign support. This
persisted until the strong United States intervention in 2001 resulting in the prolonged war that
continues to this day. More common examples of weak intervention are places where the British
prop up small enclaves such as Gibraltar or the Falklands (Malvinas).. As can be seen in Table 2,
while hot peace can last a long time casualties are minimal.
Table 2: Weak Intervention
Region Start Duration Casualties Parties Intervenors Collapse
Gibraltar 1713 304 0 Spain
Gibraltar
Britain
Falklands 1833 184 0 Argentina
Falklands
Britain
Hong Kong 1842 155 0 China
Hong Kong
Britain 0








1. Indian troops left Sri Lanka in 1990 nineteen years before the Government victory.
Prior to sending troops in 1987 the Indian government aided the Tigers through the
intelligence agency RAW. It likely that this continued after withdrawal in 1990, but there
is no information available about this, so we cannot say when or even if India stopped
supporting the Tigers.
2. Casualties in the war seem mostly to have involved Taliban massacres of civilians. The
number are unclear but do not seem to exceed 10,000 which is the basis of our estimate
of 5 per hundred thousand per year.
6.2. Medium Intervention and Prolonged War
Theory. Medium intervention on both sides results in prolonged war. This is illustrated in
ﬁgure 6.3. Notice that according to the deﬁnition there is positive resistance to leave at the two
extremes and zero resistance to move in the interior.
Discussion. As we have indicated, this seems the least justiﬁable form of intervention. Data are
collected in Table 3. The only rationale for medium intervention we can think of is that a region
poses a particular danger and hence the importance of keeping it weak oﬀsets the bloody harm
of prolonged war. Yet, if we look at the record, Vietnam, Sudan, Angola, Lebanon, and Syria do
not appear to have ever presented any great danger to the intervening powers. It is interesting
that while the US intervention in Vietnam is widely criticized outside the US, it seems to be so for
mostly the wrong reasons. Surely there was nothing wrong with supporting the South, for, despite
all the shortcomings of its government, there was no popular desire to be ruled by the equally bad
or worse government in the North. Nor can there be much moral doubt about opposing the spread
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Figure 6.3: Prolonged War
Lj → ← Lk
rk(φ) rj(φ)
Lk0 10Lj
Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving
left is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose
land and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated
by the arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process. The
back and forth arrows indicate the location of the balance of power segment where the
system moves with no resistance. Discontinuities in resistances appear at the intervention
thresholds.
of communism: one need not look further than North Korea and Cuba - two of the most miserable
places in the world - to see that. Nor is it clear why the direct involvement of the US is worse
than indirect Russian involvement. From our point of view the US should be rather criticized for
creating a prolonged and costly conﬂict by attempting to maintain a balance of power in the South.
6.3. Strong Intervention and Hot Peace
Theory. With strong intervention we get a hot peace in which a single unit of land changes
hands between adjoining thresholds for intervention. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.4.
Discussion. There are two types of hot peace: a one-sided hot peace where weak intervention
is matched against the strength of the opponent and a two sided hot peace where two outside
intervenors stare eye-to-eye across a border. Signiﬁcant cases are listed in Table 4. A classical
example of strong intervention and the eye-to-eye stare is the Iron Curtain, where military forces
of the intervenors - the US on the West and Soviets on the East - sat for decades eye-to-eye in the
literal sense. No land changed hands, but this possibility is explicitly covered by the model. A
more interesting case is in the Sinai where the intervention on both sides is by the United States.
Naturally we do not see US soldiers staring at each other eye to eye across the border, but the
essential element of the Camp David accords was the promise of substantial military support (in the
form of equipment and training) for both sides. We do note that in some places outside intervenors
in the form of UN blue-helmets patrol the boundary - taking both sides in eﬀect - but their job
is merely to act as monitors - they have not even enough military strength to protect themselves
should a shooting war break out.
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Table 3: Medium Interventions with Prolonged Wars
Region Start Duration Casualties Parties Intervenors Collapse




























1. The date at which intervention on behalf of UNITA ceased is unclear. We dated it to
May 2001 when DeBeers - the main source of funding and illicit weapons shipments to
UNITA - ceased operation in Angola.
Table 4: Signiﬁcant Modern Hot Peace Episodes with Strong Intervention
Region Start Duration Casualties Parties Intervenors Collapse


















1. It should be noted that originally the Soviets supported Israel.
2. It is unclear in which population the casualties occurred. Virtually all deaths occurred
during the six years of active war beginning in 1988. It is estimated that 28,00038,000
died in that conﬂict. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh is only 147,000, but it is
highly unlikely the bulk of casualties occurred among that population. We used the
average of the population of Azerbaijan and Armenia as our base population.
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Figure 6.4: Strong Intervention
Lj → ← Lk
rk(φ) rj(φ)
Lk0 LLj
Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving left
is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose land
and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated by the
arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process. Discontinuities
in resistances appear at the intervention thresholds.
6.4. Other Types of Episodes
The model does not and is not intended to cover all possible types of conﬂicts.
Anarchy. Our working assumption has been that hegemonic resistance is positive, but institutions
may be so weak that hegemony is not absorbing. In the absence of outside intervention there are
also no absorbing balance of power segments. In this case the theory predicts continual strife -
at least until some group develops institutions adequate to persist. The situation in the Central
African Republic, Somalia and Yemen appear to fall into this category. In the case of Somalia we
quote from the US State Department website There is no organized system of criminal justice, nor
is there any recognized or established authority to administer a uniform application of due process.
Enforcement of criminal laws is, therefore, haphazard to nonexistent.
Transitional Wars. Transitional wars are the fast leap from one absorbing set to another: from
hegemony to hegemony, from balance of power to hegemony, from hegemony to balance of power
or from one balance of power to another. The most important case is when there is no outside
intervention or outside intervention is too weak to matter. In this case we have only the transitional
war of moving from one hegemony to another, or an unstable state where two societies hold land
followed - relatively quickly - by the victory of one resulting in hegemony. However, transitional
conﬂicts also occur with outside intervention in which the intervenor is attempting to help one side
win and not to preserve a balance of power.
The case in which there is no absorbing segments and movement is directly from one hegemony
to another is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.5.
Indeed: we observe a number of wars with little outside intervention: these generally result in
hegemony and moreover, as the theory predicts, they are relatively short. See Table 5. The only
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Figure 6.5: No absorbing segment




Land of j is measured from the left, land of k is measured from the right. Society j's
resistance to losing land is in thick grey, k's resistance is in thin black. So j's resistance
decreases from right to left with j's land and once it becomes zero it remains there; and
vice versa for k - the thin black line decreases from left to right with k's land. The thick
black segment appears where both resistances are zero. In the right part of the ﬁgure
where j's resistance is positive and k's resistance is zero the system moves right - even
more land for j - with positive probability for all  ≥ 0, while the probability of moving left
is zero in the limit; in the thick black zone both societies have zero resistance to lose land
and the system can go either direction with positive probability; this is indicated by the
arrows. Notice that only hegemonies are absorbing in the limit process. Discontinuities
in resistances appear at the intervention thresholds. For illustrative purposes we have
taken the intervention threshold for k to be zero.
one longer than 1 year is the Iran/Iraq war. Often these transitional wars occur after a change in
intervention policy in the form of the withdrawal of outside forces leading to collapse of the balance
of power. A number of well known conﬂicts have this character: after the British withdrawal
from Palestine in 1948 war broke out between Israel and the Arab nations: this lasted less than a
year. Similarly when Britain withdrew from India conﬂict broke out between India and Pakistan
including conventional warfare over Kashmir. This lasted slightly longer than a year. About a year
after Richard Nixon agreed to peace with honor in 1973 - meaning actually that he agreed to stop
intervening - North Vietnam launched an assault on the South winning the war in about a year.
In Eastern Europe after Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would cease intervention the
fall of the Berlin wall came about in a matter of months.
The Rwandan Civil War is an interesting case study in what happens without intervention.
The conﬂict was largely ethnic between Hutu and Tutsi. On April 6, 1994 the plane of the Hutu
President Habyarimana was shot down initiating the Hutu genocide perpetrated by the Tutsi. By
July 3, 1994 - that is only about three months later - the Tutsi RPF overran the capital city of
Kigale eﬀectively ending the war. The absence of western intervention in this case is well known
and usually discussed in the context of preventing the genocide. Given the time-line this was
probably not feasible: the rapid forms of western intervention - air power, special forces - are
ineﬀectual against large groups of people welding machetes, and by the time massive numbers of
ground troops could have been put in place it would have been far too late. Rather the lack of
western intervention is a case study in how prolonged war can be avoided: the Tutsi won and the
peace of the strong over the weak has prevailed since.
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Table 5: Signiﬁcant Modern Transitional Wars
Region Start Duration Casualties Parties Intervenors Collapse
India 1947 1 250 India
Pakistan
Palestine 1948 0.75 700 Israel
Arab
Bangladesh 1971 1 100 Bangladesh
Pakistan
India[1] 1
Iran/Iraq 1980 8 100 Iran
Iraq
Falklands 1982 0.2 0 Argentina
UK
0.2




1. India did not attempt to preserve a balance of power but helped Bangladesh to win
the war.
We want to emphasize just how short are transitional wars compared to the prolonged conﬂict
brought about by insuﬃciently strong outside intervention. The transitional war that brought peace
to Rwanda lasted months. Moreover, the length of wars appears largely unrelated to whether they
are civil wars: although most prolonged wars are civil, absent outside intervention they tend to be
relatively short, if not so short as in Rwanda. Reaching farther back in history, the U.S. Civil War,
bloody as it was, lasted only four years. World wars - in which outside intervention is not possible
more or less by deﬁnition - also have been relatively short: four years in the case of World War I
and six years in the case of World War II.
The overall point is that these transitional wars are short: less than a decade in length and
often lasting only months. Hence although they are bloody, because they are short they are not
necessarily more bloody than a hot peace that lasts many decades.
Balkanization. Our theory deals with only two contestants: but there are parts of the world that
are Balkanized in the sense of the Balkans - or perhaps today the area of Syria and Iraq - where
more than two contestants view in a sort of free-for-all. While the details are beyond this paper
and can be found in Levine and Modica (2017) we can give the general idea.
In some areas such as the Balkans there is diﬃcult terrain so that it is hard for any side to
prevail. If every society has positive resistance to losing land all states will be absorbing (at  = 0
as usual). Since positive resistance events do occur over long periods of time, this means that
there will be recurrent conﬂicts. This seems a relatively good description of the Balkans, which has
been Balkanized and in a more or less perpetual state of conﬂict since about 1200 BCE with the
exception of periods of time when strong outside powers (Rome, the Ottomans) imposed peace.
Each time, with the withdrawal of the outsiders low level periodic conﬂict seems to have more or
less immediately resumed. Most recently large parts of the Balkans have been absorbed into the
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EU which may play much the same role as the Romans and Ottomans in bringing peace to the
region - what will happen at some future time when that power should be withdrawn we suspect
will be a resumption of the old divisions.
What about the case where terrain is good? Suppose we have a balkanization of more than
two societies. We continue to maintain the assumption that the weakest society has no resistance
to losing land. If outsiders cannot intervene simultaneously for both of the two weakest societies
then one of them must have zero resistance to losing land, and we would expect there to be zero
resistance to the strongest society winning the land. Such a change does not aﬀect which are the
two weakest societies: so collectively the two weakest societies always have zero resistance to losing
a unit of land until one of them vanishes. Eventually we get down to two societies and the model
we have developed above.
If there is a single outside intervenor this makes perfectly good sense - it is not very practical
in a multi-way conﬂict to consistently intervene on behalf of two diﬀerent clients. However, with
more than one outside intervenor it may be that each intervenes consistently on behalf of a diﬀerent
client. Speciﬁcally: if outside intervention consistently takes place on behalf of both of the two
weakest societies and is suﬃciently strong as to give both positive resistance to losing land then
it is easy to construct intervention policies that preserve the balkanization: as soon as one of the
two weakest societies wins a unit of land intervention is withdrawn until it loses the land again.
The key point is that we can have stability in a balkanization provided that there is more than on
outside intervenor against the weak parties, but it is not so likely with just one.
The Middle East is the most obvious example of a region which is generally perceived as a
balkanization. Never-the-less it can be usefully analyzed by breaking it down into two sub-regional
conﬂicts: Israel versus Egypt in the South and Sunni versus Shiite in the North. In the South Israel
and Egypt have intermittently fought from 1948 (the Arab-Israeli war listed in our table) to 1973
(the Yom Kippur war) after which peace negotiations began and ended with a further hot peace in
1979. This hot peace, enforced by strong US intervention on both sides takes the form of a treaty
that has largely resulted in the cessation of bloodshed. This appears to be the most desirable form
of hot peace.
The situation in the North is on the other hand a story of insuﬃciently strong intervention and
bloody, prolonged wars.. We have ﬁrst the Lebanese civil war, then the Iran-Iraq war, then the
conquest of Kuwait, followed by the liberation, the second Iraq war, and now by the Syrian civil
war. As can be seen in our table some of these conﬂicts can be broken into separate regions which
can be usefully analyzed by our methods.
The Kurds form a particularly interesting sub-case in the North. We have assumed that the
weakest power is the most likely to lose land. But in a multi-lateral conﬂict the larger powers may
be so focused on ﬁghting each other that a smaller power is able to survive in the shadows so to
speak. Originally the Kurds were able to occupy land as a consequence of the civil disorder and
no ﬂy zone that followed the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait: Saddam Hussein's Sunni forces were tied up
with defeating the Shia near Basra and especially the Marsh Arabs. Following second Iraq war
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politically the Sunni's and Shia's were more concerned with each other than with the Kurds - who
also received limited US support, very limited on account of the alliance with Turkey: and indeed
the oﬃcial US position has always been that Kurdistan should be part of a uniﬁed Iraq.
Syria has high resistance to losing land, especially with Russian support. The other major party
to the conﬂict in Iraq and Syria, the ISIS, appear to be zealots, unstable, having no resistance
to losing land and who consequently must either win quickly or vanish forever. As they have
not won quickly we expect they will shortly vanish forever except perhaps as a rump group of
stateless terrorists like their predecessor Al Quaeda. ISIS land, our model predicts, can go to either
Syria/Iraq or to the Kurds. Then there are two possible scenarios:
(1) The US withdraws support for Kurds. In this case at some point Kurds will lose land to
Syria and Iraq and Kurdistan will vanish;
(2) The US holds its support for Kurds. In this case our model predicts a balance of power
between Kurds and Syria - but reality is a little diﬀerent: owing to US concern with Turkey,
sustained US support for Kurds is possible only if the Kurds compromise on their requests for an
independent state and commit in advance to be part of a united Syria (like the Iraqi Kurds in Iraq)
when ISIS is defeated. If this is the case - and we think it indeed is the more likely scenario - the
outcome may be a balance of power within the context of particular states.
The Balkans themselves give a further example of how the model may be useful for analyzing
pieces of a broader conﬂict. The conﬂict between Serbia and Kosovo is one case in point. In February
1998 serious ﬁghting broke out. Despite the overwhelming advantage of the Serbians, ﬁghting ended
after NATO air intervention that began in March 1999 and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from
Kosovo in early June. The situation is well described as one of weak intervention and hot peace:
NATO intervened in suﬃcient strength that Kosovo was independent of Serbian control, but there
was never any question of Serbia's ability to defend itself against Kosovo. The overall causality
rate for a hot peace that has lasted now for 18 years was about 14,000, mostly civilian, against a
population in Serbia and Kosovo of about 9 million, about 9 per 100,000 per year, comparable to
other episodes of hot peace.
7. Why Intervene?
So far we have viewed the intervention thresholds as exogenous: in fact they are endogenously
determined by the costs of intervention and the motivations of the intervenors. Moreover, the
outside forces might be a single country or two external powers with possibly opposed interests.
Both cases have concrete examples. As we have already mentioned, England in continental Europe
has played the role of a single intervenor in favor of the weaker sides quite independently of their
nationality. In the case of the United States and Russia in the Middle East the situation is obviously
diﬀerent, with each external power supporting a diﬀerent side.
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Beneﬁts of Intervention
We suggest four possible beneﬁts of intervention. One is to prevent hegemony that may be
threatening. Examples of this are Britain and the balance of power on the continent and quite
likely the US and USSR keeping Europe and especially Germany divided after WWII. It may also
be that conﬂict among enemies is the preferred option since enemies who are ﬁghting with each
other are less threatening than enemies that are at peace with each other. Again: in the case of
Britain and the balance of power this seems to have been the case.
Another is to extract economic rents - this may have been the case with the British Indian
Empire - although the economic history literature seems divided on whether they managed to do
so or not. Another purely economic motivation may be the desire to sell arms to the conﬂicting
nations. Somewhat in between keeping an enemy weak and economic exploitation is the desire
to extend military inﬂuence and provide a buﬀer against more distant rivals - for example Russia
seems to have intervened in Syria in order to preserve and expand their naval base in Syria. Similar
motivation may be territory for the pure sake of territory - the manifest destiny of the United
States seems to be of this sort. Domestic popularity may also play a role. The Falkland Island war
was driven by the lack of popularity of the Argentine junta while European intervention in Libya
and Syria was also inﬂuenced by the unpopularity of Cameron and Hollande.
It is sometimes argued that the purpose of intervention is to preserve trading partners. However,
this seems to make little sense: why not allow one side a quick victory then trade with the winner?
Intervention may also be driven by more moral considerations - although evidence for this is
weak - either to keep your side from losing (protecting democracy) or simply because of a desire
to for the social good for peace - the motivation for this volume.
Costs of Intervention
The cost structure of intervention is relatively simple, but it is important that cost is not
monotone. No intervention has no cost, but weak intervention - intervening when your side is
already weak and the other strong - is more costly than medium intervention - when your side is
relatively strong.
For any particular goal the most cost eﬀective form of intervention should be chosen. Clearly
there is no point in wasting money on intervention so weak to be ineﬀective so the practical choice
is between weak, medium and strong intervention.
A simple and cost eﬀective form of intervention is simply to provide your side with nuclear
weapons - these are cheap and certainly a strong deterrent. Indeed this is exactly what we see.
De facto the United States has provided nuclear weapons to Western Europe, Turkey, Japan and
South Korea. By which we mean it stores arsenals of nuclear weapons in those countries. But de
facto that puts control of those weapons in the hands of those countries. There is no sensible way
in which a base containing nuclear weapons can be defended from the country hosting that base.
As the infantry general Faceman replied to the air force general Turgidson in Dr. Strangelove:
General Turgidson, with all due respect for your [airbase] defense team, my boys can brush 'em
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aside without too much trouble. This was put to the test during the 1985 confrontation between
US base defense forces and the Italian army at the Sigonella base over the custody of terrorists
that had been captured by the US forces. Needless to say the Italian army won that. We should
note also that it is unlikely that security precautions, activation codes and so forth are eﬀective..
It is one thing to protect a nuclear weapon from a terrorist with a screwdriver - it is quite another
to protect it from the top scientists and laboratories in a sovereign state.15 Finally: from the point
of view of deterrence it does not have to be a certainty that the country will be able to use US
stored nuclear weapons - a strong possibility is likely to give an enemy pause. To quote again Dr.
Strangelove: Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy... the FEAR. It is beliefs
that matter.
Deterrence in general is widely used as a cheap form of intervention through a tripwire eﬀect.
The classical tripwire is the conversation between the British general Wilson and the French general
Foch described in Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August:
A question that Wilson asked of Foch during his second visit in January 1910 evoked
an answer which expressed in one sentence the problem of the alliance with England,
as the French saw it.
What is the smallest British military force that would be of any practical assistance
to you? Wilson asked.
Like a rapier ﬂash came Foch's reply, A single British soldierand we will see to it
that he is killed.
It has been argued that US participation in NATO is of a similar quality: that the actual NATO
forces deployed during the cold war stood little chance against the Warsaw Pact so that their real
purpose was for their defeat to trigger the use of nuclear weapons. To quote the conclusion of a
the CBO report of July 1978 Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance "The brighter
assessments [of NATOs chances] are optimistic only in comparison with the more pessimistic ones."
Of course the downside of the tripwire eﬀect is that the wire may be tripped and the cost may
then be astronomically high as it was in World War I.
Single Intervenor
The most cynical type of intervention is that of a single intervenor attempting for strategic
reasons to prevent hegemony or worse trying to stir up conﬂict to keep rivals weak. This may also
be the case when two ostensible rivals collude: We may well ask about the motivation of the US
and USSR in the cold war: were the two implicitly colluding to keep Europe weak and divided? In
the case of Germany there is no doubt of the answer to that question.
We now introduce some explicit considerations. Let us rule out strong intervention as inter-
vention on both sides is impossible, so we assume the intervenor chooses between no, weak and
15Even if the original bomb cannot be used nuclear bombs are easy to build - the hard part is getting bomb grade
ﬁssionable material and a local stock of nuclear weapons provides a ready supply.
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medium intervention with no intervention having cost zero, weak intervention cost 1 and medium
intervention cost 0 < c < 1. On the beneﬁt sides we assume that the payoﬀ to hegemony of either
side is 0 and denote by w the beneﬁt of prolonged war. We assume moreover that the beneﬁt of a
hot peace is x < w. Hence, with one player choosing both the row and column - that is whether to
intervene on either or both sides - the payoﬀ matrix to intervention is given by
Table 6: One Player Game
medium k weak k none
medium j w − 2c
weak j x− 1− c x− 2
none −c x− 1 0
Here is is clear that the only viable possibility are to not intervene and get 0, to intervene
weakly on one sides and get x− 1 or to make a medium intervention on both sides and get w− 2c:
which alternative is best depends on the parameters. If x < 1 a weak intervention is too costly to
be worthwhile; if w is large and c is not so that a bloody conﬂict is highly desirable and not much
cost is incurred in supporting both sides then a medium intervention on both sides will be chosen
and a prolonged conﬂict will result.
The Great Game: Endogenous Intervention
We now explicitly consider two symmetric intervenors in competition with one another. We
continue to assume no strong intervention and we retain the cost structure of 0, 1, c for no, weak
and medium intervention, with 0 < c < 1. We assume that if neither side has an advantage both
get zero, but each intervenor prefers their side to win getting x for a favorable hot peace and h > x
for a hegemony, and correspondingly getting losing that amount if the other side wins. With this
we have the following payoﬀ matrix:
Table 7: The Great Game
medium k weak k none
medium j −c∗,−c∗ x− c,−x− 1 h− c∗,−h
weak j −x− 1, x− c −1,−1 −x− 1, x∗
none −h, h− c∗ x∗,−x− 1 0, 0
If h < c then none is dominant so let us rule out this uninteresting case. In the matrix above
best responses are marked with asterisks: in this case we see that there is a unique Nash equilibrium
with medium intervention on both sides. The result is a prolonged conﬂict.
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Prolonged War?
The model indicates two reasons for prolonged war. One is the great game between two com-
petitors who want their side to win. The other is a single intervenor who wishes to weaken a pair
of rival powers. Consider the locations of the historical instances of prolonged war brought about
through outside intervention: Vietnam, Angola, El Salvador, Sudan, Lebanon, and Syria. The ﬁrst
three are cold war conﬂicts with the intervenors the US and USSR: the great game if ever there was
one. The ﬁnal three are in the Muslim world. It is hard to believe that any outside non-Muslim
power cares whether Sunni's or Shia's gain a hegemony - hence the cynical collusion theory has
some force. If you believe - as many do - that a uniﬁed Muslim world in control of a substantial
fraction of the world oil supply is a threat then keeping them ﬁghting is worth something. To
be clear, from the Western European point of view the costs due to the (probably unanticipated)
ﬂow of refugees have been high - although one might also cynically note that from the German
perspective perhaps not, as they have taken advantage of the refugee ﬂow to remedy their diﬃcult
demographic situation. What is hard to believe in any of these conﬂicts that the behavior of the
intervenors was motivated by moral considerations of peace and prosperity for the unfortunate
inhabitants of these areas. In the case of the cold war such rhetoric was never used, and while
rhetorically it has been used in the Sudan, Lebanon and Syria it is hard to reconcile these words
with the behavior of the intervening powers.
8. Conclusion
The model we have studied sheds some light on the issues related to intervention and peace, in
particular on the trade-oﬀ between having the contenders reaching peace as quickly as possible -
which usually happens with the strong dominating the weak - and protecting the weak - which may
prolong the conﬂict. We have further seen that if the goal of protecting the weak is predominant,
then to minimize the costs of war intervention should be strong enough to avoid going back and
forth between states where one part in turn is considerably stronger than the other, and reduce
the war to what we have called a hot peace - which can be thought of as border skirmishes, and
hopefully end in reaching an unarmed negotiation stage.
However, much is left to understand. The great success story of peace is the de facto US
occupation of Western Europe after World War II, its role in NATO and promoting the European
Union and encouragement of European politicians, especially in France and Britain, that led to
durable peace and democratic institutions. This was enormously costly, and this kind of peace - real
peace - has lacked success elsewhere. Indeed US eﬀorts at nation-building outside Western Europe
and Japan has been an abysmal failure. The greatest success, ending the Israel-Arab conﬂict, has
succeeded only in creating a hot peace propped up by continued and costly US intervention.
An important question is to understand why the U.S. was so successful in Europe and Japan and
so unsuccessful elsewhere. Was it simply the willingness to commit resources on a massive scale - a
huge war eﬀort, military occupation on a giant scale, money poured into reconstruction? One may
say it is the cold war - the willingness to actively support Europe to counteract the Soviets - but
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the cold war eﬀort to intervene in Vietnam was as colossal a failure as the European intervention
was a success. Certainly the success in Europe and Japan and failure elsewhere is something that
needs to be understood. If it is simply a matter of resources and willingness to spend them, then
perhaps the US success in Europe holds no useful lesson for peace.
In a similar vein we may wish to study earlier successful and unsuccessful attempts at nation
building: for example, the British legacy in India is a stable and relatively peaceful democracy. The
French legacy in their colonies is poor - and the Belgian horriﬁc. To understand success and failure
here is to understand whether or not hegemony is a good idea. From the analysis here, however,
it is reasonable to conclude that intervention to prevent hegemony needs to be strong enough (or
weak enough) to bring about a hot peace - intervention that brings about prolonged war cannot be
good from the point of view of peace.
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Appendix 1: Balance of Power Segments
We refer to balance of power segments of length one as short and balance of power segments of
length greater than one as long.
Lemma 1. In a j, k balance of power segment there are no states below the intervention thresholds,
that is if Lj(z) < Lj, or Lk(z) < Lk, then z is not in a j, k balance of power segment.
Proof. Consider j.. Suppose ﬁrst that r0j (φj(Lj(z)), φk(L − Lj(z))) > 0. Then there is zero re-
sistance to j increasing land, but positive resistance to j decreasing land. Hence if Lj(z) is in a
segment it could only be a left endpoint. If this is the case then at z′ where j has one more unit
of land there would have to be zero resistance to j losing a unit of land. This would imply that at
Lj(z) there is outside help, that is Lj(z) = Lj - hence that in the segment Lj ≥ Lj .
Next suppose that r0j (φj(Lj(z)), φk(L− Lj(z))) = 0. Then if z was part of a balance of power
segment it should be Lj(z) > Lj , where j has positive resistance to losing land. But then it cannot
be Lj(z) < Lj because below Lj resistance of j decreases with its land.
Lemma 2. Strong and ineﬀective intervention on behalf of j against k are ineﬀective in the sense
that the balance of power segments remain unchanged if we take Lj = 0.
Proof. In the case of ineﬀective intervention the resistances are the same with or without inter-
vention (recall that at Lj > Lj there is no intervention) so the balance of power segments are the
same.
The eﬀect of strong intervention is only to slow down the fall of resistance as j loses land, and
it must fall to zero in any case because k's hegemonic resistance is positive even with intervention
in favor of j.
Lemma 3. There is a paired balance of power segment if and only if intervention is weak for both
j, k in which case the balance of power segments are the two short segments.
Proof. Suppose intervention is weak for both j and k. The two segments in the assertion, namely
from Lj to Lj + 1 going to the right and from Lk to Lk + 1 going to the left form indeed a paired
segment, directly from the deﬁnitions. From Lemma 1 we know that no state to the left of Lj or
to the right of Lk, so what we have to show is that states between Lj + 1 and Lk + 1 do not belong
to segments (between refers as usual to our preferred visualization). By hypothesis rk = 0 at
Lk = Lk + 1, and it will be zero up to some Lk + `k; analogously, rj = 0 from Lj + 1 up to some
Lj + `j (going left in our pictures). If Lk + `k and Lj + `j do not overlap they must be one unit
of land apart (formally, if Lk + `k + Lj + `j < L their sum must be exactly L − 1), because at
the state where one resistance becomes positive the other must be zero; thus from Lj + `j down to
Lj +1 there is zero resistance, and from Lj + `j up-left to Lk +1 too; and in the hole between two
adjacent states there is positive resistance both ways. Therefore in this case there is no segment
between the two segments. Suppose now that If Lk+ `k and Lj + `j do overlap. The only diﬀerence
from the previous case is that instead of the hole there is an interval between the two segments
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where points are linked by two-way zero-resistance; from the left end point of the interval there is
zero resistance down to Lj + 1, and from the right and point analogously up to Lk + 1. None of
these states can belong to a segment, as before.
Conversely, suppose there is a paired balance of power segment. Let us call walls the extremes
of the segments. At the left wall of the rightmost segment j's resistance is positive, then going down,
at the right wall of the leftmost segment j's resistance is zero (since k has positive resistance); and
at the left wall of the left segment j's resistance is positive again. Therefore here is where support
for j occurs, that is the left wall of the left segment is Lj . Similarly the right wall of the right
segment is Lk. Starting from there going down to the left wall of the same segment there is no
support for j but still its resistance is positive there. If the right segment were not short, in its
interior j's resistance would have to be zero, but it is again positive at the left wall, which is
impossible given there is no external support in that range. Thus the right segment is indeed the
short one in the assertion, which implies intervention in support of k is weak as asserted. Notice
in passing that j's resistance would be positive at the right wall if it were not for intervention in
favor of k. The argument for the left segment is the same.
Lemma 4. If intervention for j is weak and that for k is medium or there is no intervention for
k there is a single short balance of power segment starting at Lj and the intervention on behalf of
k is ineﬀective.
Proof. Existence of a short segment starting at Lj follows as in Lemma 3 from weakness of inter-
vention for j: at the threshold j has positive resistance (since the intervention is not very weak)
and so k has zero, we can move only to the right; but when we move one unit to the right, by
deﬁnition of weak intervention k has positive resistance, hence j has zero and we can move only to
the left; hence as we can move back and forth only between Lj and Lj +1 we have a short segment.
Since we know (Lemma 1) that states on the left of Lj cannot be part of a segment, to establish
uniqueness we only need to look to the right Lj + 1.
Suppose there is no intervention for k. At Lj+1 there is positive resistance by k, and increasing
j's land, as long as this is the case there is zero resistance to going left one step; at some point
k's resistance may become zero (so there is a hole there) and from then on to j's hegemony k's
resistance must remain null. Thus we have no other segment.
Suppose now that intervention for k is strong. Then it must be the case that Lk is to the right
of Lj + 1, for otherwise j's resistance at Lj would be zero. From Lj + 1 up to where Lk = Lk we
must have null resistance by j - since it is zero where Lk = Lk, going left j has less land and no
support in the range. And to the right of Lkthe situation is essentially as in the previous case: as
we increase j's land, the system can move one step to the left without resistance until a possible
hole after which j's resistance becomes positive, then right to j's hegemony without resistance.
Again there is no segment in the range.
As we have just seen the two cases yield the same stable conﬁguration, so that intervention for
k is ineﬀective.
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Lemma 5. If intervention for j is medium and there is no intervention for k there is no recurrent
balance of power segment..
Proof. By Lemma 1 no state below Lj can belong to a segment; at Lj = Lj + 1 resistance by k is
zero, and absent intervention in its favor k's resistance remains null until j reaches hegemony, by
monotonicity. Conclusion follows.
Lemma 6. If intervention for both is medium then there is a single long recurrent balance of power
segment from Lj to L− Lk.
Proof. Again by Lemma 1 states with Lj < Lj or Lk < Lk cannot be part of a segment. By
hypothesis at Lj = Lj + 1 resistance by k is zero, hence it remains zero up to where Lk = Lk + 1,
then becomes positive at Lk (where necessarily j's resistance is null). Similarly, going left from Lk
by hypothesis j's resistance is zero where Lk = Lk + 1 and by monotonicity it remains zero until
where Lj = Lj + 1, then it is positive at Lj = Lj (where k's resistance is null). This is what we
had to show.
Appendix 2: Stochastic Stability of Hegemony and Balance of Power
Theorem. [Theorem 3 in the text] There exist ∞ ≥ ϕ0 ≥ ϕ0 > 0 such that if ϕ0 > ϕ0 and if
intervention thresholds are positive on both sides there are stochastically stable balance of power
segments but not stochastically stable hegemonies, while if ϕ0 < ϕ0 there are stochastically stable
hegemonies but not stochastically stable - or even absorbing - balance of power segments.
Proof. Hegemonic resistance is decreasing in ϕ0 and by assumption positive for ϕ0 = 0. At ϕ0 = 0
there are no balance of power segments with positive radius and by continuity this is the case for
all suﬃciently small ϕ0. Hence there is ϕ0 below which there are stochastically stable hegemonies
but not balance of power segments.
By Assumption 1 hegemonic resistance by assumption falls to zero for all suﬃciently large
ϕ0 while for suﬃciently large ϕ0 the resistance to passing an intervention threshold is positive.
Hence there is a ϕ0 above which there are stochastically stable balance of power segments but not
hegemonies.
Appendix 3: Dynamics and Modiﬁed Radii
How long, relatively speaking, will the system spend in the absorbing sets we have encountered,
for small ? The analysis of the dynamics of the system hinges on two numbers describing an
absorbing sets containing a point z: the radius Rz which represents roughly speaking the resistance
to escaping far from that state; and the modiﬁed radius Mz ≥ Rz, which is a broader measure
but the same idea. The dynamics (for  > 0) can be well described by these two numbers: we
have an extension of the results concerning the relative ergodic resistance for hegemonies in the
simple model without outside intervention. As before, the expected length of time before leaving
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an absorbing conﬁguration to reach another is of order −Rz . Conﬁgurations with Rz = 0 also have
Mz = 0 and are not absorbing. In particular the stable sets are those with maximum modiﬁed
radius.
The radius of an absorbing set is the least resistance needed to reach a diﬀerent absorbing set,
and its computation in our setting is always simple. We already saw a special case of this in the
model without outside intervention, where the radius of an hegemony is the resistance to reach the
only other absorbing set of the system, that is the other hegemony. The modiﬁed radius embodies
the notion of the resistance needed to leave the set, but takes account of what path the system
might take after leaving.
As we indicated, the radius governs the length of time it takes to leave an absorbing set.
Speciﬁcally if we let T(z) denote the expected hitting time before reaching a diﬀerent absorbing
set starting at z then T(z) is of order 
−Rz . By contrast the expected length of time it takes to
actually make the leap from one absorbing set to another is much shorter: it is bounded independent
of . If we are interested in the relative amount of time spent in two absorbing sets containing the
points z and z′ respectively then the answer is given by the modiﬁed radius: the ratio of µ(z)/µ(z′)
is of order Mz′−Mz . This is proven in Levine and Modica (2016).
We refer to balance of power segments of length one as short and balance of power segments of
length greater than one as long. Consider for an illustration the case of an absorbing single long
segment, as in ﬁgure 8.1. Here, as always, Lj is measured from left to right and Lk from right to left
and the arrows in the ﬁgure denote the zero-resistance transitions. The radius is the least resistance
to reach an hegemony. Hence we compute a left radius R`jk which is the total resistance to reach
the left hegemony, a right radius similarly for the right hegemony, and conclude that for all z in the
segment the radius is Rz = min{R`jk, Rrjk}. To wit, the left radius is computed as follows: start at
the left endpoint Lj ; reduce the land holding of j one unit at a time, that is from Lj to Lj − 1 and
so on. Each time compute the resistance to the land loss (we know from Theorem 2 that since this
is absorbing the ﬁrst step at least has positive resistance); add these numbers together and continue
until j has lost all their land and become inactive. That is, we take rj(φj(Ljk), φk(L− Ljk)), add
to it rj(φj(Ljk − 1), φk(L− Ljk + 1)) and continue until all land is lost. This gives R`jk. Similarly
we compute Rrjk going rightward.
Figure 8.1: Single long balance of power segment
Lj → ← Lk
rk(φ) rj(φ)
Lk0 10Lj
The long segment is between Lj = Lj and Lj = L − Lk (indicated in the ﬁgure by the
label Lk using the reverse axis). j's resistance rj jumps up at Lj because of intervention.
In this appendix we compute the modiﬁed radii of hegemonies and balance of power segments.
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The attribute of an absorbing set that determines the relative time the process spends on it is
the modiﬁed radius, which we are going to compute for the absorbing sets we are interested in
here. The general deﬁnition is given in Levine and Modica (2016), section 6.3, we sketch here the
concept to apply it to the present setting. We say that a family of absorbing sets forms a circuit if
any two of them are connected by a least resistance path not touching absorbing sets outside the
family. The family of all absorbing sets of the process can be partitioned into circuits, and then
one deﬁnes circuits of circuits - 2nd-order circuits we may say - by taking as modiﬁed resistance the
incremental resistance needed to move from one to the other over that needed to move within the
circuit. Continuing this way one gets to 3rd-order circuits and so on (modiﬁed resistance becomes
accordingly increments of increments etc.) until all circuits of order K − 1 form a single circuit of
order K. The modiﬁed radius of an absorbing set is computed as the least total modiﬁed resistance
needed to move out of the k-order circuits in which the absorbing set is contained, all the way up
to the order K − 1. We now apply this procedure starting with a particularly simple case.
The case of rightward cascades
We say that a path between two absorbing sets is direct if it does not touch other absorbing
sets along the way and has ﬁnite resistance. A rightward cascade x1 → x2 . . .→ xn is a sequence of
absorbing sets such that the only direct paths from xi to other absorbing sets lead to the adjacent
xj 's. Denote the resistance of going back to xi−1 by Rlk and of going forward by R
r
i (the left and
right radii). To be a rightward cascade we require that Rri < R
l
i for i 6= 1, n, and we deﬁne the
diﬀerence ∆i = ril − rir which is by assumption strictly positive. In this case the hierarchy of
circuits and the modiﬁed radii are as follows. The only non singleton circuit is given by {xn−1, xn};
then one order up we ﬁnd the 2-nd order circuit {xn−2, {xn−1, xn}}, all the others being singletons.
Proceeding this way we arrive at the two-element partition {x1, {x2, {x3{. . . {xn−1, xn}} . . . } after
which we have a single circuit. So from x1 we only need to move right to x2, while from all the
others we need to move up to x1. For example for n = 4 we have {x1, {x2, {x3, x4}}}; to get out
from x1 we only need R
r
1; from x2 we need R
l
2 to move out to x1 (notice that this is incremental
as well since there is zero resistance to move within the singleton circuit formed by x2 alone); from
x3 we need R
l
3 to step out of the circuit to x2 and then the incremental resistance of moving from
x2 to x1 which is ∆2 (for the resistance of moving from x2 within this 2nd-order circuit circuit is
Rr2), so the modiﬁed radius is R
l
3 + ∆2; from x4 we need to ﬁrst reach x3 to get out of the circuit
plus the increments up to x1, so the modiﬁed radius is R
l
4 + ∆3 + ∆2. The general rule is then as
stated in the following





i > 1, while M1 = R
r
1..
Cascade with One Balance of Power Segment
It is convenient to denote the hegemony of k by H that of j by h and the balance of power
segment by B in the following. Notice that in this case we must have a cascade and we may assume
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without loss of generality the cascade is to the right H → B → h. Apply Proposition 1 to ﬁnd,
MH = R
r
H , MB = R
l





Two Balance of Power Segments
case 1: Cascade
Let B denote the segment on the left and b the one on the right. Assume without loss of
generality the cascade is to the right: H → B → b → h. Apply Proposition 1 to ﬁnd Mh =
Rlh + (R
l
b −Rrb) + (RlB −RrB), Mb = Rlb + (RlB −RrB), MB = RlB, MH = RrH .
Comments. We have Mb = MB + R
l
b − RrB; if Rlb > RrB as we may suppose, then Mb > MB.
Also Mh = R
l
h−Rrb +MB +Rlb−RrB = Rlh−Rrb +Mb; hence, assuming Rlb > RrB that is Mb > MB,
then Mh ≷ Mb ⇐⇒ Rlh ≷ Rrb . So if Rlh > Rrb the stable set is a hegemony. Otherwise b is stable
if RrH is low enough.
case 2: Two Circuits
Then both balance of power segments point at the adjoining hegemony and the circuits are
{H,B}, {b, h}. At the higher order both form a single circuit. The incremental resistances to reach
the other circuit are RrB − RlB and Rlb − Rrb so the modiﬁed radii are MH = RrH + RrB − RlB,
MB = R
r
B, Mb = R
l





case 3: Balance of Power Segments Point at Each Other - Three Circuits H, {B, b}, h
In the circuit the radii are RrB, R
l
b and the incremental resistance of going to H is R
l
B−RrB, while
that of going to h is Rrb−Rlb. Suppose without loss of generality Rrb−Rlb < RlB−RrB so that the 2nd-
order circuit is {{B, b}, h}. The modiﬁed radius ofH is justMH = RrH . For B there is the resistance




- path to b then incremental resistance to reach h; then the
modiﬁed resistance of going from this to H, which is the diﬀerence between incremental resistance
of going toH and to h (incremental with respect to remaining in {B, b}, that is RlB−RrB−(Rrb−Rlb).








RlB −RrB − (Rrb −Rlb)
)
= RlB. Since the
diﬀerence of the modiﬁed radius of b with the modiﬁed radius of B must be Rlb − RrB both being




B − RrB). For h: we must ﬁrst get to {B, b} - which





B −RrB)− (Rrb −Rlb). An alternative, sleeker derivation of Mh: the modiﬁed radius
is the cost of going to H from b, that is Rlb + (R
l
B − RrB), plus the extra cost of starting from h,
which is the diﬀerence Rlh − Rrb between the radii of h and b in the 2nd-order circuit {{B, b}, h};




B −RrB) +Rlh −Rrb which is the same value as before.
Comments (assuming supercircuit H, {{B, b}, h}). Let us suppose Rlb ≈ RrB so that MB ≈Mb.
Next, MH ≷MB ⇐⇒ RrH ≷ RlB; and Mh = Mb +Rlh −Rrb so Mh ≷Mb ⇐⇒ Rlh ≷ Rrb . Stability
is like in the single segment case: if hegemonic resistances are higher than resistance from segments
to hegemony then a hegemony is stable; otherwise the stable set is a segment (or both).
36
